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Abstract 
 
Information goods are characterised by high fixed costs and low marginal costs of production.  A 
potentially effective strategy which can be adopted by firms operating in such markets is versioning, 
whereby various features are added or subtracted from a number of distinct versions of the good.  This 
effectively serves as a means of second degree price discrimination designed to extract prices closer to 
the maximum willingness to pay from different groups of consumers. This study tests the 
effectiveness of versioning as a means of exploiting differences in willingness to pay in second-hand 
markets for information goods by undertaking the first hedonic price analysis of video gaming 
software.  The empirical evidence presented in this paper is based on the analysis of an extensive 
cross-sectional dataset consisting of over five thousand observations of pre-owned video game prices 
in the US.  Controls are introduced for a variety of other observable characteristics, including the 
quality of the game-play experience, the publisher, genre and theme of the game.  The results are 
consistent with theoretical expectations and demonstrate significant variations in willingness to pay 
can be exploited through the strategic use of versioning.  The practice is therefore argued to represent 
an effective means by which firms in these markets can enhance revenues. 
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1. Introduction 
Video gaming has rapidly evolved into a major force in the global entertainment sector.   In 2015, 
annual revenues from the worldwide video games market were estimated to be approximately $91 
billion, with around $22 billion of this total generated in the US alone (NewZoo, 2015).  The size and 
rate of growth of the market for video games exceeds those of many other mainstream forms of 
entertainment, such as music and movies.  By way of illustration, Guinness World Records recently 
confirmed that the game Grand Theft Auto V achieved a record-setting $816 million in worldwide 
sales during the first 24 hours of release (“Confirmed”, 2013). This figure represents the highest 
revenue ever generated by the launch of an entertainment product and comfortably exceeds earnings 
from Star Wars: The Force Awakens, which at the time of writing holds the current worldwide box-
office record as a result of generating $529 million during its opening weekend in December 2015 
(“All Time Box Office”, 2015).   
In theoretical terms, video gaming software is an obvious example of an information good, which is 
defined in terms of high fixed costs of production and negligible marginal costs.  Economic theory on 
pricing of information goods outlined in the seminal work of Varian (1995) and developed in studies 
by Anderson & Dana (2009); Bhargava & Choudhary (2001a, 2001b, 2008); Linde (2009); Shapiro & 
Varian (1998) and Varian (2000; 2001) highlights how a special kind of second-degree price 
discrimination known as versioning or quality differentiation can be particularly effective in such 
markets.  The practice involves releasing different versions of the same underlying product, thereby 
encouraging consumers to ‘self-select’ in accordance with their willingness-to-pay (WTP).  This has 
the obvious potential to enhance profits, even in the somewhat perverse case where producers incur 
costs in degrading the quality of ‘high WTP’ products for sale to the low WTP market.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate variations in consumer WTP resulting from versioning through 
the analysis of data from the market for used video games.  The reason for this particular focus is that 
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new software tends to be sold at a set RRP which is more-or-less constant for each hardware platform 
and means that consumer demand typically adjusts to meet a fixed price.  However, prices of used 
video games are able to vary to a far greater extent in response to variations in demand; essentially 
allowing free market valuations of titles according to variations in consumer WTP.  The specific 
research question to be addressed is therefore ‘to what extent does consumer WTP for video game 
software vary in the presence of versioning’?  In addressing this question, the study offers unique 
evidence on the extent to which versioning is likely to lead to enhanced revenues for video game 
publishers.  Further, the analysis is intended to serve as a useful aid to strategic decision making with 
respect to the effective use of versioning, both in this particular context and in other markets for 
information goods.    
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 contains a discussion of the data and 
methods used in this study, while Section 3 outlines the empirical findings.  Section 4 then presents a 
summary of the conclusions of the study, as well as the managerial implications for software 
developers and publishers.  
 
2. Data and method 
The previous section introduced the concept of the versioning of information goods and highlighted 
how the practice can be revenue (and profit) enhancing so long as two or more consumer groups exist 
with significant differences in their WTP.  This section outlines the approach used in this study to test 
the extent to which these assumptions hold in a market context where price is effectively unrestricted 
and hence allowed to vary to a greater extent in response to variations in consumer WTP.  The market 
for pre-owned video gaming software in the US is of considerable strategic importance to video 
games publishers, being valued at somewhere between $2 - $3 billion annually, with over 47 million 
people in the US purchasing one or more used titles each year (J.J. Games, 2010).  Several major 
retailers have a significant presence in this market; most notably Gamestop, which generates around 
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half of their gross profits from the sale of pre-owned video games (“Gamestop continues run”, 2013), 
as well as Wal-Mart, Best Buy, Toys R Us and Amazon.  The used market is highly attractive to 
retailers because they are able to retain 100% of the sale price, whereas royalties have to be paid to 
developers and publishers on the sale of new titles. For this reason, the resale of video gaming 
software has been strongly resisted by firms further up the supply chain, with several employing a 
range of strategies specifically designed to curtail such activity.  For example, Electronic Arts (EA) 
have previously distributed single use access codes along with new copies of games that would allow 
access to online multiplayer features.  If the game was subsequently resold in the second-hand market, 
the new owner had to purchase another access code directly from the publisher in order to unlock 
those aspects of the game.  Another notable case relates to Microsoft, who initially intended to 
employ technical restrictions for its Xbox One console that would block the use of second-hand titles 
entirely.  In both cases, the firms involved were forced to back-track on these measures due to 
significant PR backlash.   
In order to address the primary research question of this study, a dataset containing a cross-section of 
prices for used video games titles was collected in August 2010.  The data are sampled across a 
number of hardware platforms, with original release dates ranging from the mid-1990s up to the 
present day.  Price data are obtained from BRE Software’s Game Price Guide Online1, which 
catalogues over 15,000 pre-owned video game prices and is updated three times a week.  The dataset 
also includes information on a range of observable control characteristics relating to each title that 
could plausibly explain variation in market prices.  In the context of addressing the aim of this 
particular study, the most crucial characteristic is whether or not the game is a ‘special edition’ (i.e. a 
version designed to appeal to high value consumers).  The BRE price guide also contains information 
on the platform of release and whether the game comes bundled with a physical peripheral or 
accessory; each of these factors are controlled for in the empirical analysis. 
                                                          
1 http://gamepriceguide.net/ 
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Additional supplementary information for each title was extracted from the Video Games Database 
maintained by MobyGames2.  This information includes platform of release, censorship rating, 
maximum number of players allowed simultaneously and the timing of release, both in absolute terms 
and relative to the appropriate hardware platform.  Controls are also included for publisher and genre, 
as well as a measure of the opinion expressed by professional critics to serve as a proxy for 
underlying quality.  In the same way films or books are subject to widespread critical attention in the 
popular media, video games are scrutinised by critics via specialist press appearing both in print and 
online.  Studies such as Combris et al. (1997) have chosen to exclude similar information from their 
hedonic price estimation of Bordeaux wine on the grounds that the critical response to an experience 
good is not a relevant inclusion, as purchasing occurs before tasting takes place.  However, this study 
argues that review scores from professional critics are a valid inclusion in the price estimation, as they 
represent an observable characteristic known to consumers in advance of purchase. Review scores are 
obtained from the Metacritic website3, which supplies a ‘metascore’ out of 100 for an extensive 
catalogue of video games based on the weighted average of review scores published by a variety of 
printed and online sources around the world.   
The relevant categories and specific variables included in the empirical analysis are summarised in 
Table 1 and have mostly been coded in dichotomous terms, with mean and standard deviations 
reported where appropriate.  After filtering the data and eliminating a small number of outliers from 
the remaining sample (39 such observations are identified, accounting for approximately 0.7% of the 
sample), the final number of observations used in the empirical analysis is 5,118.  In particular, it 
should be noted that the mean value of the ‘Special Edition’ variable (0.025) is relatively small, 
indicating somewhat limited use of versioning in this particular market during the time period under 
analysis.  However, the data clearly show an increase in the number of special edition variants 
captured by the dataset over time.   Less than 1% of the titles sampled titles from 2000-2004 were 
                                                          
2 http://www.mobygames.com/ 
3 http://www.metacritic.com/ 
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special editions, while the proportion increases to 6% for 2008-2009 and 9% for 2010.  Given that 
there is no reason to suspect any bias in the sampling of data, this trend is likely to indicate an 
increase in the use of the practice over time.  Conversely, this pattern may also support the contention 
that premium editions are more likely to be kept by their original owners, whereas standard editions 
are disproportionately resold.  
 [Table 1 about here] 
Using these data, a hedonic pricing analysis is undertaken in order to empirically estimate variations 
in consumer WTP for used video games.  The hedonic approach is based upon the premise that the 
value of a good is a direct function of its objectively quantifiable utility-bearing characteristics 
(Lancaster, 1966) and that these characteristics are essentially traded in bundles within implicit 
markets (Rosen, 1974). However, a particular issue surrounding the application of hedonic pricing 
analysis where utility from consumption is not known with certainty ex ante is that a wealth of 
relevant characteristics can be difficult to describe and hence are not easily quantifiable (Oliner & 
Sichel, 1994; Hollanders & Meijers, 2002). Despite these inherent difficulties, hedonic pricing 
analysis has previously been applied to computer software in studies such as Gandal (1994); 
Brynjolfsson & Kemerer (1996); Harhoff & Moch (1997); Castranova (2004); Prud’homme et al. 
(2005) and Chakravarty et al. (2006).  However, as far as the author is aware, this is the first study to 
undertake a hedonic pricing analysis based on the characteristics of video gaming software.   
The data described in Table 1 are fed into a hedonic pricing estimation model, which is specified in 
Equation (1): 
lnPricei = β0 + β1SpecialEditioni + β2Reviewi + β3Ratingi + β4Agei + β5MaxPlayersi + β6Onlinei + 
β7Licensedi + β8Accessoryi + β9Multiplatformi+ β10Consolei + β11Genrei + β12Developeri + εi 
(1) 
Where lnPricei is the natural log of the pre-owned video games price for the ith video game title and 
Rating, Console, Genre and Publisher are vectors containing a variety of dummy variables designed to 
capture the presence or absence of relevant features for each title within these stated categories.  Other 
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variables represent individual title characteristics as described in Table 1.  Of specific interest is the 
estimated value of β1, which provides evidence on the extent to which versioning exploits differences 
WTP among consumers and leads to significant variation in the value of pre-owned video games. 
 
3. Results 
Table 2 presents estimation output from two different regression models. Specification (i) follows the 
functional form outlined in Equation (1), while Specification (ii) includes a number of additional 
interaction terms.  In both cases, the dependent variable is the natural log of the pre-owned game price 
and so coefficients can be interpreted as percentage changes in price resulting from a one unit change 
in the respective independent variable.  Where a majority of these variables are dichotomous, the 
stated coefficient can be interpreted as the given percentage variation in price associated with the 
presence of this characteristic. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported and used to 
determine the statistical significance of parameter estimates. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In specification (i), a majority of the general characteristic variables are statistically significant at or 
above the 95% confidence level.  The R2 value is approximately 0.58, which shows that the model 
provides a reasonably good explanation for the variation in the data in the context of a hedonic 
regression.  Other than the clear heterogeneity of prices between hardware platforms, the other largest 
variations in price are observed for special editions and games that come bundled with an accessory, 
which respectively add thirty-nine per cent and sixty-two per cent to the value of a title.  The large 
and positive coefficient attached to the former suggests significantly variation in WTP between high 
and low value groups in the presence of versioning.  This further implies that versioning is indeed an 
effective strategy by which publishers can encourage consumers to ‘self-select’ into different groups 
as a means by which to enhance revenues.  The positive and comparatively large coefficient estimated 
for titles that come bundled with an accessory is to be expected, since the consumer would be paying 
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not only for the software itself, but also for a physical peripheral (such as a mock-instrument, special 
controller etc.) which itself has an intrinsic value.   
The estimated coefficients for the other characteristic variables are mostly in accordance with 
theoretical expectations, with a few notable exceptions. The presence of a title on multiple gaming 
platforms and licensed titles are each typically valued at around six per cent less than the respective 
alternatives.  This suggests that consumers in this market value platform exclusivity and games based 
on original concepts. Online features are also found to associate negatively and significantly with 
WTP, such that market value is reduced by around ten per cent when an online multiplayer mode is 
offered.  These findings are somewhat surprising in the presence of potential network externalities 
associated with the consumption of these goods, given that platform exclusivity obviously restricts the 
size of the installed user base.  Furthermore, the presence of an online multiplayer mode allowing the 
opportunity to connect with other players represents a utility enhancing characteristic, which should 
resultantly associate with a higher WTP. One possible explanation for the latter finding is that the 
appeal of online play may significantly diminish once games reach the second hand market.  If online 
interest and activity is disproportionately clustered around the latest releases, players of older titles 
may resultantly struggle to find opponents in sufficient quantity and regularity, hence decreasing 
WTP for this feature.  Finally, when measured relative to other maturity ratings, games that are rated 
as suitable for teen players are associated with prices that are approximately two per cent higher 
relative to games suitable for all ages.  Games with a mature rating associate negatively with price, 
but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. As mentioned above, dummy variables 
which reflect the hardware platform of release are found to universally exert a significant influence on 
price, with signs and magnitudes that are entirely in line with expectations4.   
                                                          
4 An obvious question to raise at this time would be the suitability of running single regressions based on the common sample, when the 
evidence clearly suggests that pre-owned software prices are strongly influenced by the gaming platform for which the title appears.  The 
same regression analysis is conducted on separate sub-samples of the data, organised by console and the estimated coefficients attached to 
each of the other variables included in the model are virtually unchanged.  Thus, for expositional clarity, only results of the estimations run 
on the common sample are included in this report although these separate regressions add a measure of reassurance regarding the robustness 
of the parameter estimates. 
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In terms of variables designed to control for the more subjective qualities of each title, the model 
output suggests that the quality of a game has a relatively small but significant influence on its market 
value.  The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the market price of pre-owned video games is 
relatively inelastic to variations in quality, as a one per cent increase in the Metacritic rating is 
estimated to increase the value of a typical game by just under half of one per cent.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the significant influence that quality is seen to have on sales of new video games 
(Cox, 2014) and suggests that quality is a less important determinant of demand in the second hand 
market. Around half of the dummy variables representing games released by major publishers are 
significant at or above the ninety-five per cent confidence interval, suggesting that several major 
publishers have the potential to significantly add (or subtract) value from pre-owned video games.  
Five of the seven genre dummy variables are also found to be statistically significant, suggesting clear 
heterogeneity in the value of games based on content, design etc. 
Specification (ii) includes interaction terms between key model variables; specifically, age, special 
edition and review score.  While these results present a negative coefficient estimate for the special 
edition variable, this is not found to be statistically significant from zero at the 95% confidence level.  
Instead, this result should be considered alongside the (significantly positive) coefficient estimated for 
the interaction between the special edition variable and the review score, which unsurprisingly 
indicates that special editions of more highly rated (better quality) titles tend to command higher used 
values than special editions of less highly rated titles.  Furthermore, the negative coefficient capturing 
the relationship between special editions and the age of a title indicates that special editions are likely 
to decline in value over time, suggesting that second-hand demand is greatest for special editions of 
newer titles.  Finally, a relatively small negative relationship is estimated for the coefficient capturing 
interaction between the age of an individual and the review score implies that critical response has a 
diminishing influence on price as individual titles become older.  In other words, the smaller than 
anticipated association between review scores and used software prices could potentially be caused by 
a consumer’s own experience ‘superseding’ reviews from professional critics; an effect which seems 
to grow stronger as individual titles age over time. Aside from these specific insights, the inclusion of 
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interaction terms has only a modest effect upon the model diagnostics, while the estimated 
coefficients of non-interacted variables remain largely consistent with previously reported values.  
 
4. Summary and Managerial Implications 
This paper uses a hedonic price estimation to analyse the effective use of versioning in the second 
hand market for information goods, while also controlling for an extensive range of other factors 
affecting the demand for pre-owned video games. The results highlight several key factors that 
explain variations in pre-owned video games prices, not least of which relate to the effect of 
versioning on consumer WTP.  Special edition variants of particular titles, as well as games released 
for newer platforms or that come packaged with an accessory, associate with significantly higher 
values.  In contrast, the market attaches a lower value to licensed and cross-platform titles, as well as 
those with online multiplayer modes. Significant heterogeneity is also observed in the demand for 
games across hardware platforms, publishers and genres.   
These findings provide empirical evidence in support of the theory relating to the effectiveness of 
versioning in markets for information goods; particularly those with the potential for significant 
network externalities (Jing, 2000).  Additionally, these findings also have several significant 
managerial implications for video game publishers.  First, as a result of the significantly higher WTP 
observed among consumers of premium content, it is suggested that video games publishers might 
enhance revenues by operating a more widespread policy of second-degree price discrimination.  
Indeed, given the significant variation in consumer WTP observed between premium and non-
premium versions of the same game, an obvious potential exists for releasing a broader selection of 
versions for each product.  This would have the potential of encouraging self-selection and exploiting 
variations in WTP between, for example, high, medium and low value consumers, as opposed to 
simply high and low. 
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Second, assuming that publishers perceive the sale of pre-owned video games as a threat to revenues, 
these findings highlight how various strategies are likely to lead to reduced WTP within the used 
market.  Obvious examples are the decreases in WTP found to associate with multi-platform releases 
and the inclusion of online functionality.   Publishers are therefore recommended to focus on releasing 
their titles on multiple platforms, as well as integrating online multiplayer modes into their games as 
much as possible. Firms may be able to supress demand in second hand markets through strategic 
provision of online functionality and expediting the withdrawal of online support for their older 
games following the release of newer titles.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Model Variables 
Variable Name Description Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
PRICE Quoted market used price in USD 15.79 (9.669) 2.95 179.95 
SPECIALEDITION Game is listed as a special edition 0.025 0 1 
REVIEW Review score from Metacritic (/100) 69.283 (13.679) 12 98 
AGE Age of game (years) at time of data collection 4.870 (2.464) 0 10 
MAXPLAYERS Maximum number of players in offline mode 1.849 (1.313) 1 8 
ONLINE Game allows for online play via the internet 0.206 0 1 
LICENSED Game content/characters are licensed (film, TV etc.) 0.398 0 1 
ACCESSORY Game comes with an accessory (instrument etc.) 0.022 0 1 
MULTIPLATFORM Game appears on more than one console (non-exclusive title) 0.524 0 1 
RATINGS (Mutually Exclusive, Non-exhaustive) 
RATINGT Game has been awarded a Teen rating 0.324 0 1 
RATINGM Game has been awarded a Mature rating 0.152 0 1 
CONSOLE (Mutually Exclusive, Exhaustive) 
GBA Game is for the Nintendo Gameboy Advance system 0.093 0 1 
GCN Game is for the Nintendo Gamecube system 0.095 0 1 
NDS Game is for the Nintendo DS system 0.089 0 1 
WII Game is for the Nintendo Wii system 0.065 0 1 
PS2 Game is for the Sony Playstation 2 system (BASE CASE) 0.269 0 1 
PS3 Game is for the Sony Playstation 3 system 0.073 0 1 
PSP Game is for the Sony Playstation Portable system 0.064 0 1 
XBOX Game is for the Microsoft XBox system 0.151 0 1 
X360 Game is for the Microsoft Xbox 360 system 0.103 0 1 
GENRE (Non-mutually Exclusive, Exhaustive) 
ACTION Game is of the action genre (BASE CASE) 0.625 0 1 
ADVENTURE Game is of the adventure genre 0.068 0 1 
EDUCATIONAL Game is of the educational genre 0.006 0 1 
RACING Game is of the racing genre 0.141 0 1 
RPG Game is of the role-playing game genre 0.111 0 1 
SIMULATION Game is of the simulation genre 0.093 0 1 
STRATEGY Game is of the strategy genre 0.100 0 1 
SPORTS Game is of the sports genre 0.211 0 1 
PUBLISHER (Mutually Exclusive, Non-exhaustive) 
2K Game is published by 2K Games 0.021 0 1 
ACCLAIM Game is published by Acclaim 0.017 0 1 
ACTIVISION Game is published by Activision 0.082 0 1 
ATARI Game is published by Atari 0.027 0 1 
CAPCOM Game is published by Capcom 0.040 0 1 
DISNEY Game is published by Disney Games 0.008 0 1 
EIDOS Game is published by Eidos Interactive 0.021 0 1 
EA Game is published by Electronic Arts 0.131 0 1 
INFOGRAME Game is published by Infograme 0.010 0 1 
KONAMI Game is published by Konami 0.047 0 1 
MICROSOFT Game is published by Microsoft 0.022 0 1 
MIDWAY Game is published by Midway Games 0.030 0 1 
NAMCO Game is published by Namco 0.032 0 1 
NINTENDO Game is published by Nintendo 0.047 0 1 
ROCKSTAR Game is published by Rockstar Games 0.012 0 1 
SONY Game is published by Sony 0.047 0 1 
SEGA Game is published by Sega 0.053 0 1 
THQ Game is published by THQ 0.061 0 1 
SQUAREENIX Game is published by Square Enix 0.014 0 1 
UBISOFT Game is published by Ubisoft 0.058 0 1 
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Table 2: Regression Output   
Specification                             (i)          (ii)  
Variable Name 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS   
CONSTANT TERM 1.912 (0.032) ** 2.258 (0.058) ** 
SPECIALEDITION 0.394 (0.032) ** -0.219 (0.222)  
REVIEW  0.004 (0.000) **  0.010 (0.001) ** 
AGE 0.065 (0.009) ** 0.009 (0.004)  
MAXPLAYERS  0.008 (0.004)   0.008 (0.004)  
ONLINE -0.098 (0.014) ** -0.101 (0.014) ** 
LICENSED  -0.060 (0.011) **  -0.055 (0.011) ** 
ACCESSORY 0.616 (0.044) ** 0.605 (0.043) ** 
MULTIPLATFORM -0.061 (0.012) ** -0.065 (0.011) ** 
RATINGS   
RATINGT 0.024 (0.012) * 0.024 (0.012) * 
RATINGM -0.020 (0.016)  -0.020 (0.016)  
PLATFORM   
GBA 0.124 (0.020) ** 0.051 (0.021) ** 
GCN 0.297 (0.018) ** 0.227 (0.018) ** 
NDS 0.397 (0.033) ** 0.137 (0.020) ** 
WII 0.670 (0.051) ** 0.283 (0.023) ** 
PS3 0.774 (0.022) ** 0.363 (0.023) ** 
PSP 0.463 (0.035) ** 0.203 (0.021) ** 
XBOX -0.183 (0.018) ** -0.249 (0.017) ** 
X360 0.612 (0.045) ** 0.274 (0.022) ** 
GENRE   
ADVENTURE 0.024 (0.019)  0.030 (0.019)  
EDUCATIONAL 0.003 (0.073)  0.000 (0.073)  
RACING  0.035 (0.014) *  0.036 (0.014) * 
RPG 0.113 (0.016) ** 0.109 (0.016) ** 
SIMULATION 0.068 (0.018) ** 0.067 (0.018) ** 
STRATEGY 0.037 (0.017) * 0.038 (0.017) * 
SPORTS -0.164 (0.014) ** -0.159 (0.014) ** 
DEVELOPER   
2K -0.169 (0.040) ** -0.176 (0.039) ** 
ACCLAIM -0.060 (0.036)  -0.075 (0.035) * 
ACTIVISION -0.002 (0.019)  -0.005 (0.020)  
ATARI -0.058 (0.032)  -0.054 (0.033)  
CAPCOM 0.009 (0.024)  0.009 (0.024)  
DISNEY -0.208 (0.058) ** -0.196 (0.057) ** 
EIDOS -0.075 (0.025) ** -0.077 (0.025) ** 
EA -0.107 (0.018) ** -0.100 (0.017) ** 
INFOGRAME 0.105 (0.017) * 0.097 (0.052)  
KONAMI 0.094 (0.023) ** 0.089 (0.023) ** 
MICROSOFT -0.194 (0.035) ** -0.198 (0.034) ** 
MIDWAY -0.016 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.027)  
NAMCO 0.074 (0.029) ** 0.079 (0.029) ** 
NINTENDO 0.129 (0.026) ** 0.135 (0.026) ** 
ROCKSTAR -0.110 (0.044) * -0.123 (0.042) ** 
SONY -0.078 (0.025) ** -0.084 (0.025) ** 
SEGA -0.020 (0.023)  -0.003 (0.023)  
THQ -0.004 (0.020)  -0.009 (0.019)  
SQUAREENIX -0.007 (0.037)  -0.014 (0.037)  
UBISOFT -0.027 (0.021)  -0.025 (0.021)  
INTERACTION TERMS 
SPECIALEDITION x REVIEW -  0.010 (0.003) ** 
SPECIALEDITION x AGE -  -0.076 (0.021) ** 
REVIEW x AGE -  -0.001 (0.000) ** 
R Squared 0.580  0.590  
F  151.252 ** 149.110 ** 
N 5078  5078  
* Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level; ** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level 
